Sudan Update: Renewed War, Negotiations and the US Role


Helen Fein

Ed. note: the following summary is compiled from the BBC September, 2002), the International Crisis Group report of 12 August, 2002 [www.intl-crisis-group.org] and the ICG report of April 3, 2002, written under the direction of John Prendergast, Co-Director of ICG's Africa Program, and published on the ICG site and in an edited version on the Crimes of War site [www.crimesofwar.org/sudan-mag] which has resulted in over two million deaths and charges of genocide (see related article). All quotations unless otherwise attributed are from the ICG article on the Crimes of War site. 

The possibility of halting the almost two-decade long civil war in Sudan through international mediation which resulted in a tentative agreement, the Machakos Protocol of 20 July, was reduced in September as the Government of Sudan temporarily suspended its involvment in the peace protocol. Sudan's President ordered his army to "act without restraint" (according to the BBC) in response to the rebels' military victory in capturing Torit--a major garrison in the south. Both sides are alleged to have taken the offensive.

The Machakos Protocol was considered a breakthrough because it committed both sides to a referendum on unity or secession from a central government after a six-year transition period but it was very vague or ambiguous--agreement had not been reached-- on major issues: the relationship between state and religion [the imposition of Islamic law over the predominantly non-Muslim south had triggered the war], the definition of the south (and consequent control over rich oil fields), power sharing, wealth sharing and security arrangements.

The negotiations were advanced by President Bush's appointment on September 6, 2001 of former Republican Senator John Danforth as his special envoy to Sudan. "Senator Danforth's mandate was to determine whether the government and rebel groups in Sudan displayed a genuine commitment to work toward peace, and to recommend what role the United States should play in the peace process. Danforth's most prominent step so far [April 2002] has been the unveiling of four 'tests of good faith' for the parties to the conflict last November. These confidence-building measures consisted of allowing humanitarian access to the Nuba Mountains region; arranging temporary halts in the fighting elsewhere called 'zones and days of tranquility'; ending the practice of taking prisoners into slavery; and halting aerial bombing of civilians."

The accomplishment of Sen. Danforth's team in opening up the Nuba Mountains (January 2002) to international relief was alleged by an aid official to be a mere tactic to enable Sudan to channel its military strength elsewhere. "Released from that front, government and SPLA [Sudan Peoples Liberation Army] forces have repositioned for offensives in the oilfield areas, with serious repercussions for the civilian population and for the peace process. Most destructive has been a series of attacks against civilian targets [February 2002]....The attacks have also led to belated questions about war tactics. For three years, human rights researchers and activists have alleged that such attacks are part of a policy aimed at clearing populations out to facilitate further penetration by oil companies. Alex de Waal of Justice Africa has argued that 'if Khartoum were to forego attacking civilians it would have to abandon its currrent military strategy in the oilfields. its entire strategy is based upon displacing the population that lives around the oilfields.' Government representatives dispute this."

The US role in Sudan was stimulated in part by Americans' opposition to slavery there, publicized by a broad coalition of Christians and Jews, blacks and whites, liberals and conservatives. Sudan appears interested in supporting the US war against terrorism and being removed from the US list of states supporting terrorism. The Inter-Governmtal Authority on Development (IGAD) involved in negotiations joined together a coalition of envoys from interested countries in Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and observer states--the Italy, Norway, the UK and US.

 

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