Interviewer: Helen Fein

Q. In May 1994 at the ISG meeting, you related US policy to the fear of a reenactment of the perceived defeat of the US in Somalia (1993) and disinterest in Black Africa. Are there other factors?

A. Yes, the third element was the desire to avoid any other failure of UN peacekeeping which would exclude the possibility of using UN peacekeepers for some other crisis defined as more important to US interests than was the genocide. Jesse Helms and others were making threatening noises on restrictions, leading to PPD 25 [Ed.: this is explained in the article "What US Knew..." in this issue]. It was a special concern of the National Security Council.

Q. Is the peacekeeping model appropriate for responding to genocide?

A. No, but it was in place. A peacekeeping model under Article 7 (of the UN Charter) would be more appropriate. An Article 6 intervention is with the consent of the parties involved whereas an Article 7 intervention allows the imposition of force in the interest of restoring peace. 

Q. What was your experience in 1994 in contacting members of the administration like?

A. It was clear to me that there was a high level of personal concern on the part of middle-level people to whom I spoke but they were as frustrated as we were that they could get no action from the administration. Human Rights Watch (HRW) proposed many possible actions to them.  We proposed to Prudence Bushnell [State Department] that Pres. Clinton get together with other world leaders for a clear denunciation of genocide. She raised it and later told us that others in the administration had responded that HRW should instead take out an advertisement in the New York Times.

Q. What do you think about the denial by Pres. Clinton of knowledge at the time and the denial of guilt of most other members of his administration? [Ed.: see article "What US Knew..." in this issue]?

A. Can you use crudities? Clearly they knew; they knew early, they knew a lot and they decided to do nothing. The National Security Archive documents show at how high a level the discussions were. One of the measures we asked particularly was the jamming of the radio; the documents show they negated that. What we were saying was being heard.  Bushnell and Donald Steinberg (National Security Council [NSC]) were very anxious for full information and were very committed to make something happen during the administration. I had far less contact with Susan Rice [NSC] but my sense was that she was not committed in the same way but her concern was preserving the long-term interest of peacekeeping. In any case, it seems that the significant person in that office (International Operations of NSC) was Richard Clarke.

Q. In the Atlantic article [September 2001], Power concludes that the incentive structure for response to atrocities has not changed. "Officials will still suffer no sanction if they do nothing to curb atrocities." Can you conceive of any way to change the incentive structure? What could we be done by to remedy the lack of public pressure?

A. Political leaders recognize that popular opinion can sway political action. Part of what has to be done has to do with accurate and credible reporting from the press that was not there. There is also a need to mobilize among organizations--we need to draw on organizations based on the Holocaust, African -Americans, church groups, women's groups--to arouse public pressure.

A. We don't need a new organization but a network of communication among existing organizations.

A. I am not sure. There is a gap here.  I haven't given up on a Congressional inquiry and I hope the publication of Samantha's book and the NSA archives may propel this. A congressional inquiry is a way to make the greater public aware of its responsibilities on this issue.