In this and the previous issue (ISG Newsletter #23), we consider humanitarian intervention in East Timor and Kosovo by multi-national coalitions. East Timor is the easier case to justify in terms of aims, means, and ends. It was a right cause, approved by Indonesia under coercion after it had waged intolerable violence against the East Timorese, was internationally licensed and was the less violent intrusion. The sovereignty of Indonesia was not recognized by most states (nor the UN) in East Timor -- invaded by Indonesia in 1975 and subjected to war, genocide and occupation estimated to have eliminated about one/third of its people -- and Indonesia had promised to recognize the independence of East Timor, if it chose such in a referendum in August 1999 (see Hefner, this issue). Further, Indonesia agreed to allow the troops of Australia (and other Asian states) to enter in September two days after the United States withdrew all aid -- a sanction advised by several human rights organizations for months. So it entered with no authorized resistance, with UN approbation, and with near universal condemnation of the Indonesian army and army-sponsored militias responsible for the wave of killing of East Timorese and expulsions of them to West Timor. The will of the principal intervenor was reinforced by widespread demands for action by the Australian public as well as fears of a refugee influx. The intervention enabled many East Timorese to come out of hiding, some to return, and the East Timorese to look forward to independence after a quarter-century of repression and oppression.
Thus, the intervention may be deemed successful. However, there are still problems securing the freedom of East Timorese in camps in West Timor and in controlling the Indonesian military (also see Hefner's recommendations in this issue). (Retrospective analysis may focus on other interpretations of the role of the US -- its failure to condemn and cut off aid to the Indonesian military earlier -- and other states supporting Indonesia (including Australia) as well as that of the United Nations, which did not call for peacekeeping troops prior to the plebiscite.
By contrast, in Kosovo, there was general recognition of Yugoslavia's sovereignty but widespread indignation in the west against gross violations of human rights which threatened the lives of Kosovars, justifying to many humanitarian intervention despite the tension between humanitarian law and the United Nations Charter (see forum, ISG Newsletter #23). There was no initial approval by the UN Security Council, although the terms of settlement were authorized by the UNSC after Russian mediation. The bombing elicited resistance and the acceleration of mass expulsion of almost a million Kosovars, massacres -- victims of the latter cannot yet be disinterred and tallied -- and led to the deaths of 1,500 civilians. Yet, despite many doubts (by supporters and opponents of the intervention) about the congruence between ends and means, Yugoslavia accepted the demands of the coalition after 78 days. And most of the Kosovars returned.
Other consequences -- in Kosovo and in Europe -- are not so benign. The near confrontation of Russia and NATO in occupying Kosovo, and the increasing bellicosity of Russia (discussed later), the continued rule of Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade and his use of hostility to the bombing to cement Serbian cohesion (a predictable response) are part of the problem. A more pressing question, for which SFOR (NATO) bears some responsibility, is the lack of will or inability -- competing bureaucracies, lack of funding leading to insufficient peacekeepers -- of NATO forces and the United Nations administration to halt collective and arbitrary violence against Serbs and minorities (principally the Roma) in Kosovo -- beatings, killings, and house burnings. Surely, those who backed the intervention to halt and reverse "ethnic cleansing" ought not tolerate it being done under their watch. Intimidation by the KLA of Kosovars who back nonviolence, a pluralist democracy, and a free press is also reported. "Democratization" will not solve this -- indeed, true democracy is impossible under these conditions. The message from President Clinton on his visit in December asking Kosovars to forgive the Serbs did not address this. What was needed was not to ask them to forgive the Serbs but to tell them they should not do to others what they did not want others to do to them with local illustrations.
The Russian re-opening of the war against Chechnya in November 1999 on a pretext may have many motivations. What is not likely is that it was just a response to bombings in Moscow for there have been no suspects, no indictments of Chechens or others in such bombings. Indeed, some analysts have inferred that they were the work of the security services. Had Chechens committed the bombings, those individuals could have been indicted and tried; it would not justify collective retaliation against all Chechens.
When Russia demanded (on December 6, 1999) that the citizens of Grozny leave their city or die (according to the BBC translation), that was a criminal threat of a deliberate war crime. World reaction was critical but muted. Still, the criticism caused Russia to withdraw or rephrase the threat.
Imagine what the reaction would have been had Britain told the citizens of Belfast they should leave or risk death by massive bombardment so that the UK could pursue IRA terrorists responsible for bombings in London! Since Chechens are citizens of the Russian Federation (just as residents of Belfast are citizens of the UK), they have a right to expect the state to protect them.
Yet many Chechens have also risked deat not only from a Russian strategy designed to minimize Russian casualties but because of the tactics of Islamic extremists who have refused to vacate towns or let Chechens flee when asked.
Some in the west have asked whether an intervention would not be justified: are lives in Chechnya worth less than in Kosovo?
The answer to both is negative. But an intervention in Chechnya would not be wise -- not because Russia is more sovereign than Yugoslavia nor because the US and Russia have many mutual interests (such as preventing nuclear war) -- because the magnitude of harm produced by the war against Chechnya is probably less than the magnitude of harm likely to be produced by an intervention. Launching a war in the Caucusus could not but produce more death and devestation in Chechnya and deaths of the intervenors and the Russians. Nor would western intervenors be able to protect or govern the Chechens. Humanitarian intervention is not a panacea, an all-purpose remedy; its justifications and usefulness depends on many preconditions discussed at the last conference of the Association of Genocide Scholars.
This does not mean the west is impotent to restrain the course of the war. Protest has not been exhausted and economic sanctions have not been used. The call by Human Rights Watch on December 14 for cutting off the projected International Monetary Fund loan to Russia should be heeded.
But few ask what is the portent of the war with Chechnya. Looking at this in the context of Russia's failures and the widespread insecurity of its citizens -- a defaulted currency, widespread immiseration, a decline in life expectancy, amidst increasing inequality made more obvious by the flagrant consumption of new gangster capitalists -- the need for diversion and scapegoats seems clear. Chechens before the bombings were known as "blacks" in Moscow, as were other Caucasians, and treated accordingly. The use of antisemitism at the highest level (see "Brief Reports" this issue and Schlapentokh, Newsletter #23) and the failure of local governments in Russia to protect Jews against threats of assault indicate they are likely to be a scapegoat. Unlike the Chechens, many individual Jews are in high and visible places. General Makashov has already called for reinstatement of the Jewish Pale of Settlement -- referring to Jews as "Yids" and "bloodsuckers" and vowed to send them to the next world without censure in the Duma in which he made the speech in 1998.
Both challenges to authority and economic crisis also form the context not just of threats but of collective and political violence in Indonesia in 1998 and 1999. We have witnessed outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence in many distant places in Indonesia since the fall of President Suharto in 1998: Aceh, Ambon, Borneo, Irian Jaya, Penambangum and West Kalimantan. Reports that the military held off containing these killings or participated in them include Richard Lloyd Parry, "The Suharto Shadow" (New York Times Magazine, July 18, 1999, 38-41) and Terry McCarthy, "Descent into Madness," (Time, December 7, 1998, 54- 56).
In the past, social researchers have shown the critical role of authorities in setting off or tolerating collective violence (pogroms and communal riots) in many lands. Russia had a history of pogroms against Jews until the twentieth century. Although antisemitism was officially suppressed by the Soviet Union, it has been re-created now by the Communist Party (still the leading party in the Duma) and the Orthodox Church, as well as "extremists" and is tolerated at the highest level. Indonesia has a tradition of anti-Chinese pogroms which was re-evoked in the rioting against Chinese and rapes of Chinese women in mid-May 1998 in which "elements of the military" were involved, according the the United States Department of State Country Reports.
Exploiting ethnic hostility in Kosovo triggered Milosevic's rise to power in 1989. But ultimately the promotion of exclusive nationalism, war and genocide has had disastrous results for the Serbs. It has led not only to the economic decline and political isolation of Serbia, but the expulsion and flight of great numbers of Serbs from Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. These refugees have been largely overlooked by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the international community. Insofar as NATO is in charge of Kosovo, it is incumbent on it to guarantee the security of all citizens there.
The scenario of division, violence and exclusion in Yugoslavia may be nearing an end. But it should be prevented elsewhere. . There are differences between Indonesia and Russia in the use of propaganda, ideology, and organization of violence; the triggers of incidents; and the diversity of groups -- as well as the role of the military -- which demand investigation. Both in Indonesia and Russia, the evidence of the state sponsored or tolerated agitation against scapegoats and the failure of the state to protect minorities must not only be monitored, it must evoke a response by the international community. To be responsible, we must not overlook either the consequences of intervention or the precursors of potential crimes. Such signs could become an overlooked early-early warning.